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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the State of Utah 
GLENDORA JACKSON, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
ARTHUR LARRON COLSTON ·and 
MARY A. ZUPO, doing business 
as POSTURE-FORM STUDIO, · 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 7199 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
Appeal from the Third Judicial District Court, 
in and for Salt Lake County, Utah 
'It .· . ' > : . j · .. . )' CLYDE & CORAY, 
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IN THE SUPREME COUR.T 
of the State of Utah 
GLENDO·RA JACKSON, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
ARTHUR LARRON COLSTON and 
~IARY A. ZUPO, doing business 
as POSTURE-FORM STUDIO, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
c·ase No. 7199 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT 
In order to present more clearly the real issue 
involved in this appeal, we add. to appe).Iant's general 
"Statement of Facts'' the following: 
Plaintiff alleged in her complaint (Tr. 3) that she 
was ''severely burned in and about the left ankle and 
left foot and in and about the right foot; that la.rge, 
open sores and lesions developed as a result of said 
burns * * * * *. '' The plaintiff testifieil; .at length as to 
the taking of tre.atments but did not t:estify a:t .any time. 
or in ,any way that she. expe:rienced any burn or p,aifn or 
even discomfort during the treatments. 
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The whole case of plaintiff is predicated upon a 
statement alleged to have been made by defendant Mary 
Zupo to the plaintiff on August 1, 1943, related by the 
plaintiff in the following words. She said, referring to 
Mary Zupo ( Tr. 89), '' Oh, yes, they h~d burned me, 
and she was sorry.'' The defendant Mary Zupo was 
not a doctor or a nurse but really a layman in the treat-
ment and u.se of the lamps. The plaintiff testified, among 
other things, that the lamps were placed 36 inches away 
from her ankle (Tr. 78, 79), -and that she, the plaintiff, 
never removed her shoes or stockings during any treat-
ment. The plaintiff also testified (Tr. 83) that the heels 
and toes were open, but the ankle didn't break open 
until about the middle of May. The hole in the heel was 
almost a complete split around the heel, and the toe was 
like the flesh had been pried open (Tr. 84). Dr. Plumb, an 
·expert witness on electricity, light and heat, examined 
the lamps admittedly used by the defendant and testified 
(Tr. 258, 259, 263) that the use of the lamps in the way 
they were used could not produce a burn upon the plain-
tiff's leg. 
The Court directed a verdict for the defendants on 
the ground that the evidence did not show that the plain-
tiff was burned, or that the use of the lamps was the 
proximate cause of the burn, and on the further ground 
that under the evidence, the submission of the case to the 
jury would leave the jury to speculate as to what did 
cause the sore and the splitting and breaking out of 
the flesh around the plaintiff's ankle and heel and toe. 
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ARGUMENT 
Counsel for appellant take the position that the 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable here. We 
challenge this position on the g'Tound that the plaintiff 
and the defendant together were using these lamps. 
The plaintiff was conscious and free to move her foot 
and was required to cooperate with the defendants in 
the placing of the lamps with respect to plaintiff's foot 
and the duration and manner of the use of the lamps. 
The plaintiff did not testify that the lamps burned her 
or that she suffered any burns at all. Counsel seek to 
come in under the purported statement of Mary Zupo, 
the operator, as plaintiff says Mary used the· words, 
''Oh, yes, they had burned me, and she was sorry.'' 
Certainly Mary Zupo was not qualified as an expert to 
testify to the burn as a fact. An unsworn extra-judicial 
statement is of no greater effect. 
On the question of what is meant by exclusive con-
trol, we direct the Court's attention to the following 
cases: 
Clark et ux vs. 1City of Bremerton, Washington, 
97 Pac. (2d) 112. 
Stanolind Oil !(/!; Gas ~co., vs. Bunce, W·yoming, 62 
Pac. (2·d) 1297. 
In this case the Court stated at page 1301: 
''Of similar import are the essentials of the 
doctrine as well phrased by Dean Wigmore, 5 
Wigmore on Evidence (2d Ed.) 498, S·ec. 2509, 
thus: 
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'(1) The apparatus must be such that in 
the ordinary instance no injurious operation 
is to be expected unless from a careless con-
struction, inspection, or user; ( 2) Both in-
spection and user must have been at the time 
of the injury in the control of· the party 
charged; ( 3) The injurious occurrence or 
condition must have happened irrespective 
of any voluntary action at the time by the 
party injured. ' 
''And the learned author supplements this 
statement: 
'It may he added that the particular force 
and justice of the presumption, regarded as 
a rule throwing upon the party charged the 
duty of producing evidence, consists in the 
circumstance that the chief evidence of the 
true cause, whether culpable or innocent, is 
practically accessible to him but inaccessible 
to the injured person.' '' 
Honea et al v·s. ·City Dairy, Inc., 140 P. (2d) 369. 
Morrison vs. LeTournea;u Co. of Geo.rgia, 138 F. 
(2d) 339. 
The Court here at page 341 stated: 
"It is urged that the pilot, LeTourneau, was 
not licensed to carry passengers, and that he 
violated the Federal regulations and statute in 
that the pilot had only a private pilot's license 
and was not authorized to take passengers aloft, 
and that this constituted negligence per se. This 
contention of appellant overlooks the further req-
uisite that the violation of the statute must be 
the proximate cause of the injury. The evidence 
here wholly fails to show the proximate cause of 
the injury, but leaves this- important issue entirely 
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to conjecture and speculation.'' 
Brooks vs. Utah Hotel Co., 159 P. (2d) 127; 108 
u. 220. 
We challenge this claim on the further ground that 
the purported statement of Mary Zupo, a mere layman, 
is not and cannot be considered an admission of the 
defendants that they injured or caused the injury to 
the plaintiff's ankle. We again point out that the plain-
tiff never testified that she was burned, and the pur-
ported statement cannot be held as an admission or as 
evidence that the defendants had burned the ankle of 
the plaintiff. The statement does not refer to the ankle 
and does not refer to any treatment, and lacks in time 
and certainty so that there is no evidence of the cause 
of the plaintiff's injury before the Court. The evidence 
showed at one time an ulcerated condition of the ankle. 
The evidence also showed split heel and split toe and 
cracked flesh about the foot which was never exposed 
to the heat and was always protected from the heat 
by the shoe and the stocking. 
The Court and the jury were then left to speculate 
as to what did cause the sores and ulcerations on the 
plaintiff's foot and ankle, and the Court was right in 
refusing to submit the question of other possible causes 
to the jury and leave them to so speculate. 
The position of the appellant is challenged further 
on the ground that under the undisputed evidence-and 
the plaintiff made no effort of any kind to dispute the 
testimony of Dr. Plumb-it was utterly impossible for 
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these lamps-the only lamps used-placed as they were 
and used as they were-to cause any burn of any kind 
upon the plaintiff's foot. Dr. Plumb testified, after ex-
amining the two lamps involved (Exhibits 3 and 4, Tr. 
255 ), as follows: 
"Q. (by Mr. Coray): I ask you to look also at 
this lamp, Dr. Plumb, on which I now have my 
hand, and ask you if you have ever seen and 
examined this lamp¥ 
A. I have examined both lamps today and 
tested them. 
THE COURT: They might to avoid confu-
sion, they might be marked as exhibits even 
though they are not left here and placed in the 
exhibit room; they might he withdrawn. 
MR. CORAY: We have no objection. 
THE CO·URT: If that is marked Exhibit 
"3" and that is marked Exhibit "4" then the 
record will have some means of identifying the 
two exhibits. 
MR. CORAY: That is agreeable, Your Honor. 
May the record show Miss Zupo identified 
the lamps, Exhibit "3" now marked, as being the 
lamp on the second table, and Exhibit "4" being 
the lamp used on the third table. 
THE COURT: I assume no objection to that. 
MR. HANSON: If that is Jhe fact, -you 
folks didn't offer them. 
THE COURT: The record will show. 
(Thereupon defendants' Exhibits '' 3'' 
and "4" are marked for identification.) 
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Q. (by Mr. Coray): Now, Doctor, I ask you 
to state if you will, \vhat your examination of 
Exhibit "3" consisted, that is what you did in 
the course of your examination of itf 
A. I measured its power input, and roughly 
its power output, its electro magnetic control; 
it is not a lamp. 
Q. Will you state whether or not you took the 
object apart and examined the interiorf 
A. I took it all apart and examined the in-
side to be sure it was in good working order. 
Q. Will you tell the Court and Jury what is 
contained inside of this object f 
A. There is an annular coil of wire which 
has a small iron core sticking out toward the 
glass and when that is put on a lighting circuit, 
120 v. lighting circuit it consumes about 100 watts 
and makes a magnet. 
Q. I see. Now, Doctor, does an object of that 
type have any heating power, any burning power 
whatsoever f. 
A. Yes, it. has a slight amount of what is 
called infra-red radiation of heat and that amount 
would be less than 25 watts. 
Q. So that I might understand you then, is 
the amount of heat, or burning, or sensation which 
is derived from that about equivalent to a 25 watt 
globef 
A. Or less. 
Q. I see,-and what about the magnetic effect 
that is produced by that object, what can you tell 
about that, Doctorf 
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A. It will pick up :sn;1all nails, hairpins, pins 
and things of that sort. 
Q. Do the magnetic forces which emanate 
from· that lamp when it is running at full power, 
have any detrimental effect on the human body1 
MR. HANSON: If you know. 
A. Say that again pl~·ase. 
Q. If you know, do you know whether the 
magnetic forces which eni.anate from that lamp 
have any effect on the human body~ 
A. I know they do not. 
* * * :JI: 
Q. (by Mr. Coray): Will you explain your 
reason for your conclusion in that regard, D"Octor! 
A. The total magnetic flux comes out of that 
generator there, that coil would be less than the 
total magnetic lines through a person's body 
standing close to it, than the normal lines of force 
traveling through their body from the north pole 
to the south pole of this earth. 
Q. Am I to understand then, Doctor, from 
your testimony there are magnetic lines of force 
running from the north pole to the south pole 
that continuously go through a person's body on 
this earth~ 
A. All the ~time, day and night. 
Q. And am I to understand the magnetic 
force exerted in Exhibit "3" is less than the mag-
netic powers from the north to south pole~ 
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A. True. 
Q. Doctor, from your examination of that 
object, which we have called Exhibit "3", I ask 
you to assume the following set of facts : 
That over a period of app·roximately one 
month a patient is placed, we Will say touching 
the glass portion of this object, Exhibit "3 ", for 
a period of app·roximately ten minutes on about 
five or six-make it about eleven occasions, and 
the lamp is turned on, or the object is turned on 
with its full force and power, could, or do you 
have an opinion whether or not Exhibit ''3'' 
could cause a burn upon that person~ 
A. My opinion is no. 
Q. And will you tell us the reason for that 
opinion, please, Doctor~ 
A. In ·the first place the magnetism would 
not burn. 
Q. Is there any other possibility of a burn 
resulting from it~ 
A. And I told you before there is only a 
small amount of heat comes out of that, less than 
25 watts, and 25 watts two or three inches from 
a person's body would not burn them. 
Q. Now, from your examination, Doctor, is 
there anything between the -coil contained in 
Exhibit ''3'' and the glass which appears on the 
front of it~ 
A. No, except a small piece of iron. 
Q. What is this that renders the inside in-
visible from the outside~ 
A. A piece of paper, asbestos-by the way 
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I think it is asbestos paper which could keep heat 
from going into a person's body. 
Q. Have you operated and turned this lamp 
on, -Doctor~ 
A. Yes, and measured the power. 
Q. After the lamp has been running for a 
period of time, say fifteen minutes, is that ample 
to maintain its maximum heat~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. I will ask you to state whether or not it 
is perceptible for a human hand or a person's 
body in feeling the heat from the outside~ 
A. If you wanted to hold it there twenty or 
thirty minutes you will feel a slight amount of 
warmth, nothing more than a slight amount of 
warmth. 
* * * * 
Q. (by Mr. Coray): Then, Doctor, I call your 
attention to Exhibit "4", which I believe you 
also examined~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. And will you tell us what Exhibit "4" is 
please., Doctor~ 
A. It is an ordinary infra-red heat lamp. 
Q. Did you make measurements as to the-
A. Input. 
Q. -input and output energy of that~ 
A. At the normal voltage that is here in the 
building the input-or any here in town-the in-
put on that is not over 240 watts, and it has a 
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controller on so you can turn that down to much 
less than that. 
Q. The maximum intake is 240 watts' 
A. Maximum. 
Q. Yes. 
A. And with the controller you can turn that 
down to about 100 watts. 
Q. How does that controller work to control 
voltage? 
A. Resistance rheostat in the back of th.e 
lamp with an adjustable handle on it. 
Q. Now, Doctor, how does this lamp, Exhibit 
"4", compare with other devices that we are 
commonly familiar with, can you give us any com-
parison so we can understand about how much 
power that is' 
A. I have brought along a few lamps, I have 
put on the table; the first one at the west is 
the largest one, that is 1000 watts. 
* * * * 
Q. Now, I ask you, Doctor, if you are able 
to compare the a.mount of energy heat which 
comes out of Exhibit "4" with the amount of 
energy that comes out of the sun as felt on this 
earth' 
A. The amount of energy which in the sum-
mer time shines on your body as infra-red radia-
tion from the sun, if you are outdoors, would be 
more than the amount of that energy that comes 
Q. By that you mean Exhibit ''4''' 
out of that unit there. 
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A. Yes. 
Q. So then am I to understand, Doctor, that 
you are more likely to suffer a burn from having 
been in the sunlight on a summer day for ten 
minutes, than you are to be under the lamp Ex-
hibit '' 4'' for the same p·eriod of time~ 
A. Correct. 
Q. Now, Doctor, I ask you to assume the 
following facts: That a woman goes to a studio 
for treatment, that for over a period of approxi-
mately one month, on eleven separate occasions, 
she is placed under this lamp, Exhibit '' 4' ', with 
the lamp at a distance of approximately two feet 
from her body and with the rays of the lamp 
shining directly on the top of her ankles,-and I 
ask; you to assume that i~ all, except the last one 
or two of those eleven trips, she wore her shoes 
and on all occasions she wore . stockings which 
were not removed, and those treatments took 
place never oftener than every other day, and 
some at intervals of four or five days between 
them. 
Do you have an opinion whether or not this 
lamp, Exhibit "4" could cause a burn upon the 
flesh or p·erson of that lady~ 
A. I would say a normal person's flesh could 
not be burned especially when you consider the 
shoe and the stockings which are both non-con-
ductors, tending to stop the radiation from com-
ing in.'' 
The mere statement claimed by the plaintiff, Mrs. 
Jackson, to have been made by the defendant Zupo, as 
she testified: '' Oh, yes, they had burned me, and she 
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was sorry,'' is not, in the face of the physical facts as 
to the location and use of the lamp·s by the defendant 
and the testimony of Dr. Plumb, which stands wholly 
undisputed, substantial evidence. This is especially true 
when it is considered that defendant Zupo was wholly 
without sufficient medical training to recognize a burn 
by the lamp, if in fact there was any burn. We direct 
the Court's attention to the case of H aarstritch v·s. Ore-
gon Short Line, 70 Utah, 552, 262· Pac. 100, at page 562, 
the Court said : 
''The most pointed evidence on the part of 
the plaintiff as to when the freight car came into 
view is that of the witness Howlett, who testified 
that he first saw the car when it reached the 
center of the street railway track and that the 
automobile was then within 15 or 20 feet of the 
crossing. It only need be stated here that the 
testimony of Mr. Howlett in that resp·ect flies in 
the face of uncontroverted physical facts and 
therefore is not substantial evidence.'' 
With this as the only testimony before it, the jury 
(as to the use of the lamps and this being wholly un-
denied) could but only speculate as to what did cause 
the sores and ulcers on the plaintiff's ankle and foot, 
and such evidence could under no possible theory sus-
tain a verdict or finding that the use of the lamps was 
the proximate cause of the injury. Under such circum-
stances, the Court could only direct a verdict for the 
defendants, and it would have been a clear error to have 
submitted the case to the jury for speculation. We direct 
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the Court's attention in support of this proposition to 
the following Utah cases: 
Reid V'S. R:ailroad, 39 Utah 617. 
In this ease the Court said at page 621: 
"It is a familiar rule that where the undis-
puted evidence of the plaintiff, from which the 
existence of an essential fact is sought to be in-
ferred, points with equal force to two things, one 
of which renders the defendant liable and the 
other not, the plaintiff must fail. So in this case, 
in order to entitle respondent to recover it was 
essential for her to show by a preponderance of 
the evidence that the cow entered upon the right 
of way through the broken down fence. This the 
respondent failed to do." 
Richards vs. Railroad ~Company, 41 Utah 99. 
In this case the Court considered to what extent, 
from the fact that a train struck the horses found killed 
on the tract, negligence could he inferred, and whether 
the inference followed from the mere killing that the 
engineer had an opportunity to stop the train, and there 
was, therefore, negligence, and then stated at page 109: 
"No doubt negligence may be inferred, but 
there must be some fact or facts from which the 
inference may be deduced. But, assuming that 
respondent could rely upon the inferences re-
ferred to for the purpose of making out a prima 
facie case of negligence, were not those inferences 
fully met and overthrown by positive and un-
challenged evidence produced on behalf of ap-
pellant¥ 
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''If this be true, then this case comes squarely 
within the rule announced by this court in the case 
of Christensen v. R.ailroad Co., 35 Utah, 137, 99 
·Pac. '676, 20 L.R.A. (N.S.) 255, 18 Ann. Cas. 1159. 
In that case the rule is stated in the seventh head-
note thu·s: 
'Inferential evidence of negligence is 
overcome by defendant's undisputed testi-
mony showing that there was no negligence; 
and, where plaintiff's case rests entirely on 
such inferential evidence, the case must be 
taken from the jury.' 
"In Goss v. N.P. Ry. Co., 48 Or. 439, 87 Pac. 
149, the rule is stated in the following language: 
'Where the evidence of negligence is en-
tirely inferential, and the testimony for the 
defendant is clear and undisputed to the 
effect that there was no negligence, the plain-
tiff's case is overcome as a matter of law, 
and it becomes the duty of the judge to take 
the case from the jury.' '' 
The appellant asked the Court to infer that the use 
of the lamp caused the ulcer and splitting of plaintiff's 
heel and toe, which were always protected and never 
exposed to the lamp. 
Haarstritch vs. 0. 8. L., 70 Utah 552. 
The case of Peterson V'S. Richards, 73 Utah 59, 272 
Pac. 229,. is clearly distinguished. In that case there 
was no question as to the crushing of the hand of plain-
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tiff. There was no question of proximate cause. The 
only question was as to whether the injury occurred in 
the operating room. Here the existence of an ankle 
ulcer is proven, the cause is not shown, and the Court 
refused to ask the jury to speculate as to the cause. 
We respectfully submit that there was no error 
in the ruling of the Court and that the judgment of the 
trial Court should be in all respects affirmed. 
CLYDE & CORAY, 
SKEEN, THURMAN & WORSLEY, 
Attorneys for D-efendarnts 
and Respondents 
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